<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Ai-Security on Greycloak</title><link>https://greycloak.com/tags/ai-security/</link><description>Recent content in Ai-Security on Greycloak</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en-us</language><copyright>Copyright © 2023, Vince Wadhwani; all rights reserved.</copyright><lastBuildDate>Sat, 12 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://greycloak.com/tags/ai-security/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>What Anthropic's Misuse Report Reveals About Providers</title><link>https://greycloak.com/post/2026-09-12-anthropic-details-ai-misuse-and-threat-activity/</link><pubDate>Sat, 12 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://greycloak.com/post/2026-09-12-anthropic-details-ai-misuse-and-threat-activity/</guid><description>
&lt;p&gt;If you run workloads on a third-party model API, you are also inheriting that provider's enforcement decisions and its threat surface. A report from Anthropic this week makes both concrete, and it is worth reading for anyone weighing where to route sensitive data or how much to trust an intermediary in the chain. The company documented distillation attacks, competitors quietly relaying user traffic to Claude, and a blocked grant application that sought to make a mosquito-borne virus more dangerous. These are described as the most notable cases the company has found, not the typical ones, but they map the kinds of abuse any large provider now has to police.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>